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	This paper represents a first and thus preliminary account of an ongoing research project on the EU’s Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper). The objective is to interview a significant number of current and former ambassadors and staff-members of Coreper and associated working groups in light of the research program outlined below. The interviews, reflecting a representative sample of old and new member states, began in 2004 following the presentation of the EU’s draft constitution and the accession of the new member states. The following report provides an overview of the findings thus far.

Why Study Coreper?
	Coreper is often described as an elusive body, non-transparent and under-researched. As a de-facto decision-making body in the EU, it is important to have a better understanding of how this body functions and the patterns of action inside it. This leads us to a core question about EU-decision making: Are institutionalists correct to argue that institutions and their culture matter, or are Coreper and the Council working groups just transmission belts that translate national power and interests into outcomes? This question forms the starting point of our research, and the answers provided here were formulated with this question in mind.

The Theoretical Context: Research Objectives and Conceptualizations
	According to Article 151 of the Treaty of the European Union, the Committee of Permanent Representatives is “responsible for the work of the Council and for carrying out the tasks assigned to it by the Council.” This charge has been called one of the most remarkable acts of political empowerment in the history of the Union because, as Bieber and Palmer (1975: 313) observed, “a great deal of completely undefined power has been handed over to the permanent representatives to work out major questions and certain unresolved details. The majority of the preparatory work and of the negotiations leading up to a final vote in the Council is thus done by the body of permanent representatives in close consultation with their home governments. In short, Coreper is the institutional arena of the permanent representations through the ambassadors, deputies and staff of, previously, 15 and now 25 member states. 
	There are a number of indicators that Coreper is not merely a forum for negotiations consisting of instructed delegates but that members have considerable discretion and room to maneuver so that Coreper has in fact evolved into a de facto decision making body. This is most poignantly exemplified by the so called A (“agreed”) points procedure under which the agreed points are sent en bloc to the ministers and passed without discussion. By some accounts up to 90% of Council decisions are made this way.  Despite the potentially considerable importance of Coreper, the institution has remained something of a black box, partly because its lack of transparency has served as a protective cloak, partly because its relative obscurity has directed attention to more prominent and accessible areas of interest. As a result, it has, with a few exceptions, largely eluded scholarly scrutiny so that there is scant literature on the subject.  An added curious aspect has been the fact that, while Coreper intends to be a forum for representing national positions on policy matters, it is also charged with achieving consensus and compromise, thus transcending the interests of individual member states. This Janus-like feature of the committee has given it a somewhat ambiguous reputation. Coreper’s position at the heart of EU decision-making in conjunction with a continuously increased role of this institution gives rise to the following three research questions:

(I) The Nature of Decision Making -- Pure Barging versus Sociological Institutionalist Accounts:  Generally speaking, two conflicting accounts of EU decision-making permeate the research literature. According to one, the actors in the EU-Council are self-interested maximizers proceeding on ordered and fixed preferences (e.g.,Moravcsik 1993). The outcomes of such bargaining (games) are determined by (a) relative power, (b) strategic rationality, (c) intensity of preferences as well as, (d) a general tendency towards lowest common denominator agreements. Thus, outcomes are seen as converging on the preferences of the major member states (France, Germany, and the UK), in which side-payments and package deals seek to balance winners and losers and help overcome the resistance of a critical mass of minor member states. This account of EU-decision making generally discounts or de-emphasizes institutional and sociological aspects of the negotiation process. 
	An alternative view of EU-decision making does not ignore power and self-interest but contends that these factors are insufficient to understand bargaining outcomes. This literature takes its cues from the Statist literature (Rueshemeyer and Evens 1985) and the sociological institutionalist perspective (Kratochwil 1993, Hayes-Renshaw 1995, Katzenstein 1996, Finnemore 1996, Hall and Taylor 1996, Peters 1997, etc. as well as older literature by Haas 1958, Lindberg 1963). Already earlier research on the former European Community had noticed that Cocor, the predecessor of Coreper, was a novel community-type organ in which behavior differed from traditional conference diplomacy. More recent work has also suggested that communicative rationality (Risse-Kappen 1996), styles of decision making (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1995), the cultural-institutional context (Katzenstein 1996), collective templates, cognitive maps, and frames of meaning (Ruggie 1993, Hall and Taylor 1996), and corporate culture (Kreps 1990) influence to varying degrees the outcome of the bargaining process. 

(II) Coreper as Transmission-Belt of the Community Method: 
	A second important theoretical concern is to examine the proposition (c.f., Lewis 1998b: 487) that Coreper is an important socializing agent for the member states. This not only pertains to the acquisition of technical knowledge of new individual representatives in Coreper or new member states. Socialization is also understood in the sense that it creates generalized reciprocity that can reconcile self-interest and solidarity. In short, although this institution is designed to accommodate national interests, members quickly learn that “acting tough and sticking to positions” (ibid.) yields few rewards (especially in an environment of iterative negotiations with many rounds of bargaining). Instead, according to the argument, flexibility, preparedness to compromise, and trust-building are seen as integral to successful participation in Coreper. These dynamics are subsequently relayed back to the administrations in the home capital, informing and modifying their expectations and approach. It is important in this context to distinguish between the socialization in terms of Community values that inform the actor and infuse emotional attachments (e.g., supra-nationality, trans-national cooperation, and value of reaching an agreement) and Community rules that prescribe specific actions. 
	The alternative view to this position contends that the socializing effect of Coreper is limited. Career-oriented civil servants fearing recriminations from their superiors and being well aware of their nation’s political goals are unlikely to stray from their instructions or significantly affect their country’s initial preference/position. Although members may become more skillful in their negotiations in a tactical sense (signaling displeasure with instructions, forging alliances and appearing to be more conciliatory), this, however, may have little independent bearing on substantive outcomes (a) as the negotiators themselves are generally the product of the same political socialization as their superiors in the home government, and (b) as the negotiators are keenly aware of the real power differences between the respective member states they represent and act accordingly (“when the German spoke everybody paid close attention” (own interview).

(III) Coreper as an Institution Undergoing Change that Requires Analysis:
	As an evolving system of governance, the European Union is undergoing transformations that also critically affect its institutions. Among the most important changes in the 1990s, following the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, has been the expansion of the powers of the 

European Parliament. A large number of legislative matters have now been made subject to the so-called Co-decision Procedure in which the Council and the Parliament must “co-decide” to pass legislation. It is important to note that Coreper, as some argue (Bostock 2002), plays an essential part in these proceedings and has thus enlarged its power even further. For one, agreement on the Council’s second reading of proposed legislation is invariably reached in Coreper and endorsed by the Council without discussion under the aforementioned A-points procedure.  Secondly, the Conciliation Committee with the Parliament consists on the Council side of members of Coreper led by the Member State holding the EU presidency. Some (Shackleton 2000) have actually argued that this reconciliation process resembles a “trialogue” in which Coreper plays a rather distinct role as a mediator. Differently stated, although final word under Art. 251 TEU rests with the Council and Parliament, it is the Conciliation Committee (in which Coreper members play a crucial role) where “the deal is reached and the deed is done” Bostock (2002: 221). 
	Another area of change has been Coreper’s role in the Intergovernmental Conference and the preparation of European Councils, both in drafting the agenda and conclusions. In this regard, it is important to note that the permanent representatives and their staff must work closely here with the offices of the heads of governments, rather than, as is normally the case, with the foreign ministries.
	A final, but undoubtedly crucially important, new development has been the admission of 10 new countries to the EU, which substantially increased the size and complexity of Coreper. Here, the obvious question is in what ways the decision-making process, both in its formal and informal dimensions, has been affected. As time constraints have grown while, formal opportunities for personal interaction have decreased, one wonders what adaptive measures have been taken.

The central research questions may be stated as hypotheses with the following Indicators:

(H1) Coreper functions as an important socializing agent for the Member States and their representatives, which modify their expectation and behavior over time.

$	Indicators: Significant evidence of changes in behavior and strategy over time; signaling disagreement with instructions by home government; increasing willingness to compromise and find conciliatory solutions; guidelines and instructions from home administration provide greater flexibility to negotiator; modification of initial preferences

(H2)  Besides the (member state’s) relative power, strategic rationality, intensity of preferences, the rule-making decisions in Coreper are significantly affected by sociological and institutionalist aspects.

$	Indicators: Acting by departing from instructions; acting by making recommendations to home administrations; acting especially on the need to minimize confrontation; acting especially on the need to maintain alliances with certain other members; acting despite not having definitive instructions from home capital; acting although key information cannot be sought from the national capital; critical roles not always played by most powerful member(s); significant concessions in the interest of collective solidarity; acting as coordinator and trouble shooter

(H3): Co-Decision Procedure has increased the role of Coreper in the legislative process by affording its members a special role in the Conciliation Committee.

$	Indicators: Evidence of a “distinct” mediating role; analysis of changes in draft legislation before and after the mediation process; amount of legislation adopted en bloc by Council without discussion;

Coreper’s Function, Structure, and Institutional Fit
	Established in 1958 and anchored by treaty in 1967, Coreper’s role was strengthened in 1974 when the European Council increased its scope of action. In accordance with Article 207 of the EC Treaty, Coreper prepares Council meetings both in formal terms and with regard to content; moreover, it can also make procedural decisions. Its main function is to coordinate the work of the Council in its various formations​[1]​ and to achieve far-reaching agreement so that the Council can adopt a legislative act. This coordination is important to guarantee the coherence of EU policies. 
	All orders of the Council of Ministers are prepared by Coreper, which means that in practice some 70-90% of all decisions are de-facto – not formally - made within that committee. It is the only Council body to deal with all EU issues and policy areas. At the lower level, approximately 200 Council Working Groups are entrusted with specific policy issues; at the higher level of Ministers, nine formations operate in the specific policy fields. In addition to Coreper, there are a number of committees such as the Political and Security Committee, which also play a role in the Council's decision-making.


	Coreper has met in two formations since 1962 to prepare each forthcoming ministerial meeting: Coreper I consists of the deputies of the Permanent Representatives and prepares most of the specific policy areas, (e.g. single market, energy, transport, environment, health, fisheries, consumer protection, education and culture, etc). Coreper II is made up of the Permanent Representatives (like their deputies, these are the ambassadors of the now 25 member states) and deals with institutional questions, external affairs, economics and finance, justice and domestic affairs, and the budget. The institution has thus been bifurcated according to a functional division of labor, with the ambassadors handling the more sensitive political matters from the General Affairs Council to the budget as well as the structural and cohesion funds. Coreper I, by contrast, presides over the so-called technical Councils.
	The meetings take place usually twice a week. The negotiating results of Coreper that are passed on to the Council of Ministers fall into two groups: “A-points” are areas upon which agreement was reached within Coreper. These can be formally accepted without further discussion by the Council. “B-points” are the genuine negotiating issues for the ministers. For example, in the case​[2]​ of the Fifth Framework Programme for Research and Technology Development, most issues were settled in the Research Working Group or in Coreper. The left-overs for ministers were: The overall budget, its distribution among key action areas, and the main structure of the Framework Program. 
	One structural problem of Coreper is that its working methods do not basically provide for extensive formulation work; for this purpose and for resolving technical questions, it establishes various Working Groups. Most of these approximately 200 groups are permanent, others ad hoc. They all work according to the same rules as Coreper and follow a defined protocol.​[3]​
	It is important to note that this structure is embedded in a multi-dimensional web of relationships. First, there is obviously the relationship and interaction between Coreper and the Council as well as between Coreper and the respective home government. Then, however, there is also the relationship between the Working Groups and Coreper as well as between the Working Group members and their home ministries. 
	The Working Groups themselves negotiate on the basis of the proposals put forward by the Commission. The objective is to draw up solutions for the technical issues by examining the legal text word by word. They pass on the texts to Coreper; if too many questions remain open, Coreper may refer the text back to the Working Group. This decision about what Coreper will and will not accept is made by the Chairman of Coreper. According to our interviews, the personal style of the chairman is decisive as it bears directly on the extent and specificity of the accepted outcomes. 
	This point raises an interesting question about the perceived “role” of the institutions concerned and is a first indication of the complexity of the decision making process involved. At first glance, the issue seems straight-forward in that the technical points are to be delegated to subordinate bodies while political questions are reserved for the ambassadorial and ministerial level. Generally speaking, Coreper tries to reduce the number of open points to more political issues. Yet, as our research shows, the members of Coreper and even of the working groups have varying perceptions of their role and the identity of the institution in which they serve. Specifically, there is a tendency of the people on the inside to regard their role and that of their institution as more powerful and political in nature than those on the outside, who consider Coreper and the affiliated bodies as more technical. However, interviewees also expressed the concern that in the future their body might become reduced to a forum for technical problem-solving in a larger EU. 
	The members of Coreper also play a role in the Council meetings themselves. They sit at the side of their ministers, providing advice on how and when to intervene in the discussion or to react to interventions by others. They lead national delegations in the Council in the absence of a minister, and, although the Treaty formally reserves the right to vote to ministers, it is de-facto the Permanent Representatives who vote. The Committee carries forward the results of the Council decisions and discussions. Coreper’s dominant objective is thus to maximize agreement at its own level and maximize the chances of agreement at Council meetings. 
	Coreper’s contribution to decision-making is the result of the special position of its members, who on the one hand are policy generalists, on the other experts in the substantive questions of a subject matter. The Committee can be expected to operate best when dealing with issues that are too politically charged for a Council Working Group to resolve, but still at a level of too much technical detail for ministers.  Coreper’s skill lies in combining political and bureaucratic skills in a wide variety of portfolios. Given its competence and permanent presence in Brussels, Coreper plays an important role as a hub between the member states and the EU. 
The Process of Instruction – Formal and Informal Aspects
	In principle, the ambassadors and representatives in the Working Groups (WG) act on the basis of instructions from the capital. The formal process of preparing instructions is institutionalized – in the capital as well as at the Permanent Representations in Brussels. Generally, instructions are coordinated between the relevant ministries by the foreign ministry. 
	In reality, however, the effectiveness of interaction depends in large measure on the relationship between the ambassador and the various Working Group representatives to their home government. Particularly, in the latter case, these individuals are frequently drawn from the department concerned with the specific subject matter under consideration in the WG. The organization of the home ministry, the role of the representative in his or her old department, as well as the professional, political, and personal contacts to former colleagues all play an important role. 
	Austria is a particularly instructive case to demonstrate the complexity of the coordination process involved.  Divided among no less than three different cabinet ministers, the area of science, research, and innovation policy is highly segmented in terms of political responsibility. Moreover, the respective ministries themselves and also their subordinate administrative units are frequently subject to political rivalries and shifting party-political loyalties. This is because Austrian governments are usually party coalitions and routinely promote political proteges. As political fortunes and governments change, bitter turf battles may ensue, when a new minister from a different party seeks to reduce the influence of a top bureaucrat or administrative unit that is too closely associated with a previous government or another political grouping.​[4]​ Since civil servants are generally tenured, they cannot be dismissed, demoted, or easily transferred. However, a new minister may nonetheless reassign decisions to a different administrative unit if this seems politically expedient. A representative in Brussels must be keenly aware of such political complexities. This is particularly important, if the required instructions come from two responsible ministries that either have different political interests or are controlled by different political parties and thus pursue different agendas. Intra- and inter-ministerial rivalries are therefore as much a factor as is the question of whether the Coreper official has the “right” party connection and thus political clout to be an effective interlocutor. We will explore the issue of conflicts of interest between different ministries more fully further below.
	If a representative enjoys good personal relations with the home administration, we found that they frequently discuss the instructions by telephone so that the interaction becomes de-facto a two-way exchange in which the representative can much more effectively shape, if not necessarily the decision of the home department itself but, at least the perception of a given subject matter. Particularly in cases in which a representative felt that positions were inappropriate, interviewees mentioned that they wanted to know who in their home government held such a position, so as to arrive at a better estimation of the importance of that particular viewpoint -, i.e., whether it was an isolated opinion or a confirmed party-line. Our research indicates that such informal conversations allowed representatives to gage how much leeway they had; after all, few of them seem to relish representing positions for their country that they believe to be wrong.
	The formal process of preparing instructions is essentially similar in all member states, although there is some evidence that certain ambassadors draw up the draft instruction themselves and then send it to the capital for confirmation or correction. Again, this depends very much upon the standing of a given individual and the position he or she enjoys with respect to the political setting in the home country.  In some countries such as the United Kingdom and France, instructions for all Working Groups are coordinated by a single body in the capital. The advantage of this procedure is that coherent positions can be represented in all EU bodies; something which, according to several interviewees, worked best in the case of the UK. 
	It is interesting that smaller countries, where one would expect flatter hierarchies and the benefit of reduced size and, thus, administrative complexity, do not have an automatic advantage in terms of better coordination. Conversely, Germany does not seem to be able to emulate its British and French counterparts in presenting always a consistent position because the former is a victim of its federal structure, which necessitates extensive coordination between the Länder​[5]​ and the federal government. In fact, size and resources seem to have little bearing on the effectiveness of coordinating and providing instructions. Much more seems to depend on the specific administrative culture, the organizational structure of the home government, and the specific political setting. While the level of coordination concerning the agenda of the Working Groups may vary from country to country, instructions for Coreper itself, particularly for Coreper II, are usually coordinated by the respective foreign offices. Once again, the standing of the foreign ministry within the overall political setting is essential for speedy and effective coordination.
	Generally, the decision making process happens under enormous time constraints. Traditionally, Coreper meetings are on Wednesdays but the chairperson can mandate further sessions on Thursday and/or Friday. After receiving the text from Brussel on Thursday, instructions must therefore be gathered by the home government and transmitted by the following Tuesday evening. Given that, in many government offices around Europe, weekends are a serious matter and often begin at noon on Friday there is little time to formulate a position on a agenda in question. This is even more difficult if the original text first arrives in French, which is not a working language in most government departments in Europe, or if instructions require an input from several different government departments.
	A particular problem is the tendency nowadays that, instead of the ministerial civil service staff, the personal cabinets of the ministers prefer handling certain policy matters. Thus, a “Sherpa” may be unwilling to act on an issue until receiving a “nod” personally from the minister. In such circumstances, coordinating instructions is frequently delayed so long that they become haphazard because they are communicated only partially or e-mailed to Brussels late at night and only following frantic phone-calls between different units of the home government.
	In the Austrian case, where we were permitted to obtain an actual copy of such an instruction (“koordinierte Weisung”) for Coreper I, one cannot help but be impressed, as an interviewed official put it, with the ability “to reconcile, week after week, complex policy matters with the requisite template and format of instructions” so that it can be communicated as unambiguously as possibly to someone at a distant location, who is part of a fluid process of negotiations. This specific set of instructions comprises 12 pages of text and 14 points of order, so-called TOPs (Tagesordungspunkte),13 of which pertain to the A-points and one to the B-points. These bear each a number (TOP 1, TOP 2, TOP 3....) followed by a brief paragraph stating Austria’s position on the agenda item in question such as a decision on a personnel appointment, a procedural step, or a policy matter. Each numbered point is succeeded by a clearly marked instruction (e.g.., “Kein Einwand [no objection],” “Keine Wortmeldung erforderlich [no statement necessary],” “Sollte eine Wortmeldung erforderlich sein. Österreich unterstützt...mit Nachdruck [Should a statement become necessary, Austria strongly supports ...].” Objections are expressed with the wording “Die ablehnende Haltung der österreichischen Position bleibt aufrecht [Austria’s negative position shall be maintained ].” 
	The document includes also a lengthy overview of previous Coreper proceedings detailing both the informal and official positions of several other members and a debriefing of a Commission official. As this information could have come only from the Austrian Coreper representatives themselves and was obviously intended for circulation in the home departments, it seems interesting to find it included once again in the outgoing dossier. Given that the input for the B-points came from a ministry other then the foreign office, each instruction carried a corresponding reference indicating its place of origin (e.g., “gemä Weisungsvorschlag BM....[as proposed by the Ministry of ...].
	The process of instruction naturally raises the question of whether Permanent Representatives have a scope for independent action. To what extent can they influence the position of the member state that they represent themselves? Following a first series of interviews, we have gained the impression that the opportunities for such influence is greater than initially expected. This fact famously prompted the German Permanent Representative Dietrich von Kyaw to joke once that at home he, the ständige Vertreter [“permanent Representative”], is known as the ständige Verräter [“permanent traitor”] (Barber 1995). 
	For the most part, this is due to the fact that the representatives have the advantage of information both in terms of the substance and the atmospherics. Specifically, the ambassador has an overview of all the dossiers and, particularly, a seasoned representative will have a strong role in shaping policy formation. Needless to say, governments also understand that keeping their representatives in Brussels on too short a leash will undermine trust and confidence in that person and hamper his or her deal-making ability. Officials in the home government that we interviewed and who are charged with coordinating instructions sometimes complained also that they neither have enough insight into how positions in Coreper and the Working Groups emerge nor feel always fully informed by the other departments from where they have to retrieve information needed for the instruction.  
	To the extent that many governments fail to formulate a coherent policy, differences in the national position may be exploited by a Permanent Representative in order to maintain room to manoeuver. Obviously, such leeway depends greatly upon how important the policy issue under consideration is in the context of domestic politics. For example, Austria was not a major player in the Fifth Framework Program and thus not as intent on pushing a particular agenda as others. Therefore, Vienna was more amenable to modifying its position if required. However, this flexibility ended where funding for nuclear research was at stake, an issue heavily favored by the French. Given that Austria considers itself something of a nuclear free zone and that two major Austria political parties regard this question as a central political issue, the room to permanent representative’s maneuver to on this point was highly constrained. 
	Likewise, whenever member-states interlink issues in one policy area with those in others, the negotiating space available to a representative may shrink. One example of a very open linkage from the Fifth Framework Programme for Research and Technology Development, causing weeks of concern, occurred when Spain was willing to approve the budget for the RTD Framework Programme only upon condition that the compatibility of this budget with the overall EU seven year budget (Agenda 2000) would be re-examined a year after the decision about the future finances has been taken. The reason was Spain’s fear that in the future, money would be taken away from the structural fund in order to increase the financial framework for the research program. Generally, there is also plenty of evidence that instructions are purposefully left flexible so as not to constrain the Representative needlessly. In some cases, when an instruction cannot be fully coordinated the Representative is notified to expect a follow-up instruction with further details. 
	Naturally, it is frequently the case that an official does not agree with an instruction, either because it comes at the wrong time, is incomprehensible, reflects particular national interests too strongly, hampers the negotiating process, etc. Here, people have developed mechanisms for evading such “unreasonable” or inappropriate instructions, ignoring them or weakening them. One such method is to distance oneself from the instruction by reading it out but with the preceding remark, “Chairman, I have to present the instruction now” or by stating that one will make a personal effort to have the position changed at home. The latter method is a popular one as it indicates personal commitment and a willingness to negotiate. 
	In the case of all other instructions where there is “no conflict between the instruction giver and the instruction receiver,” there is also scope for independent negotiation. In many cases, instructions will set out a maximum position and a fallback or minimal position, quite deliberately leaving the rest to the negotiating skill of the ambassador. If it is not possible to coordinate the national position whenever different ministries hold different views, Coreper representatives are sometimes told not to take instructions too seriously. This also provides a certain amount of leeway.
	In short, the answer to the question of whether there is any leeway for independent action, is a clear yes. As indicated above, differences are to be found in the degree: in the Working Groups, more rarely in Coreper, representatives occasionally have to act without instructions, either because the instruction comes too late, because no final opinion has yet been 

agreed in the capital or simply because there is no one to write an instruction. For an individual who knows his or her own country, it is not much of a problem to take action because it is possible to more or less estimate the position; where a new issue is at stake, this is, of course, much more difficult.

Shaping the National Decision-making Process:
	Ambassadors and representatives in the Working Groups gladly make frequent use of their ability to advise the capital and thus define the position of their own country themselves or at least influence it. As indicated above, their advantage over the person from whom they are receiving their instructions is that due to their permanent presence in Brussels, continuous contact, and exchanges with colleagues from EU institutions; they are significantly better informed and much more experienced. Neither should one underestimate the role played by atmosphere and personal relationships in negotiations. This viewpoint was generally shared both by the officials in Brussels and in the home government.
	The institution of Coreper is thus an important case for testing the assumption concerning pure bargaining versus the sociological institutionalist image of EU decision making. This applies for the following reasons: First, it is an institution in which (depending on different estimates) between 70% and 90% (Lewis 1998b: 483) of the decisions are de facto made. Secondly, the members of Coreper have an unusual space to maneuver as their actions cut both ways (they transmit the preferences of their home governments and negotiate on that basis, but they also transmit their subjective perception of the constraints and opportunities to their home government, indirectly shaping their response). Thirdly, the members of Coreper have varying degrees of power to make concessions. Forth, all members fulfill a double role guided by written instructions (from their government) and the unwritten rule of self-restraint and responsibility vis-à-vis the Community (the clash between narrow national interest and solidarity with the collective). Fifth, Coreper is an institution in which, according to preliminary interviews by us and others (Lewis 1998a), informal contact between Coreper members play a vital role in shaping outcomes (“The really frank discussions take place over lunch” interview in Lewis 1998b: 487). Sixth, Coreper has been viewed as a body in which experienced members, also from smaller states (e.g., the legendary Belgian Ambassador Philippe de Schoutheete), can play a constructive role beyond the relative strength of the country they represent.
	Summing up, our findings thus far suggest that Coreper does function as a socializing agent for the member states, especially through their representatives, as they invariably modify their expectations and conduct over time. There is consistent evidence of changes in behavior and strategy, which is coupled with an increasing willingness to compromise and find conciliatory solutions. Moreover, there is every indication that, all things being equal, negotiators are able to affect not only guidelines and instructions from the home administration to gain greater flexibility but that there is also some modification of the initial preferences themselves. Although this takes the form of many incremental steps rather than abandoning a cherished political principle, we believe that the socializing effect is so substantive that it warrants further detailed analysis.

Formal and Informal Patterns of Decision-making? 
	The question that raises itself next is: How and why are decisions made by the Council? Respectively, which informal patterns of action exist beside formal decision-making? There are two distinct images of decision-making in the EU. In the first, actors are self-interest maximisers, preferences are fixed and outcomes are determined by relative power and strategic rationality. Decision-making tends towards the lowest common denominator; size matters, bargaining outcomes tend to reflect the preferences of Germany, France, and the UK. In the second image, power and self-interest also matter, but interests and preferences are constructed through processes of social interaction.

Policy Linkages and Package Solutions:
	It would be logical to assume that Coreper is especially well suited to establish links and to ensure exchanges between various policy fields. Firstly, because all material comes together horizontally in a single body. And secondly, because unlike the civil servants in the working groups and unlike ministers in the Council, the ambassadors are not committed to any one particular policy area and are also not personally involved. Indeed, linkages are repeatedly attempted and are sometimes also successful. 
	Several points are noteworthy, however: For one, interviewees stated that in their experience, the strategy of linking policy areas tends to be used more by large than by small member states; secondly, they are rarely expressed in the formal negotiating process, instead being negotiated informally in consultation with other member states. Consequently, the formation of alliances contributes to the success of linkages. Linkages can be systematically encouraged at the national level and given institutional support. One example of this is the unit that has been established at Downing Street to provide the British Prime Minister with suitable 

proposals. This kind of body encourages the use of linkages, because, above all, they require a political decision at the national level and good strategic planning. 
	During negotiations, delegates make frequently use of package solutions within a policy area, especially when the negotiations have reached a dead end or need to be speeded up. These linkages are also agreed informally. The Council President knows the national priorities and sensitive issues of the individual member states. In bilateral negotiations behind the scenes, he or she tries to buy the agreement of one country for something that is a matter of vital interest to another country with a trade-off on something else.
	 If we, thus, probe deeper into the different mechanisms of informal decision-making and examine the linking of policies,​[6]​ it becomes quickly evident that this falls into a grey zone where formal and informal patterns of action impinge on the eventual outcome.

Alliances and Established Patterns of Cooperation:
	Our findings indicate that it is generally vital to enter alliances if one wishes to assert one’s national interests. This is all the more essential if the member state is not one of the big four and likely to become even more important in an enlarged EU of 25. It is remarkable, however, that this fact is not uniformly recognized and has been neglected, according to the self-admission, even by a smaller state like Austria.​[7]​
	As is well-known, the patterns of cleavages are on the one hand geographical and cultural. States with close political ties and similar cultures frequently form alliances: North versus South (this also includes the axis UK, the Netherlands, Denmark). On the other hand, there is a cleavage between the large, and small countries – big versus small – whereby the “axis of the large countries” is highly assertive (if for no other reason than the weighting of votes in the Council), while the smaller states only rarely join forces to systematically assert their interests. This is probably due to the heterogeneity of the small member states because there are, de facto, few shared interests which are of equal importance to all. 
	Then there is the so-called “alliance of net payers,” that unites all those who pay more into the EU budget than they can get out in the form of flow backs. This alliance asserted itself for example in the resolution for the overall budget for the Fifth Framework Programme when the net payers laid down the upper limit. 
	The dividing line between alliances and solidarity is blurred as decisions in the Council are often based on prior informal agreements made at all levels: between the Permanent Representatives, between representatives of the Working Groups, between ministers, between the country holding the presidency and individual states. No obstacle appears too large and there are virtually no limits to bilateral or multi-lateral agreements. At some of the nine Council formations, major decisions are taken at lunches of the ministers where civil servants are not present. 
	As informal agreements are made for a variety of motives and have different goals, it is hard to quantify their success in general terms. The spectrum ranges from focussing negotiations in a specific direction to de-facto negotiations of solutions. That means, they are used both to assert national interests as well as to reach and prepare compromises. For example,  EURATOM is an extremely sensitive topic for Austria and its research program was to have been negotiated during the Austrian presidency. This meant that Austria would have had to act neutrally. Consequently, an agreement was reached with the preceding British presidency to bring the negotiations forward, which allowed Austria to abstain from the vote. In exchange, a topic that was sensitive for the UK was dealt with under the Austrian presidency. Generally, Austria had already defended its most important national interests in the Framework Programme before its own presidency.

The Culture of Negotiations in Coreper.
	When examining the culture of negotiations in Coreper, we find that it is shaped by the committee’s Janus-face nature which commits the Permanent Representatives to a dual loyalty. They fulfill a double role guided by written instructions to express national interests on the one hand, and the unwritten rule to reach a Community consensus on the other. The twin charge of having to defend national positions while, on the other, being forced to strive for reaching an agreement and serving the European idea creates a set of conflicting obligations that seems more pronounced in Coreper than in other EU bodies. The Permanent Representatives hold a horizontal viewpoint in which they see the broader picture of the interests of their country. Coreper’s collective identity is further underscored when this body has to engage other institutions such as the European Parliament as part of the Co-decision process, which will be discussed further below.
	The principal questions here are therefore the following: How does the culture of negotiation influence the behavior of the individual members of Coreper? What socializing effects can we observe? A socialization effect in the spirit of the community becomes apparent according to our interviews. To earn a reputation, an official feels having to do both, that is, be a tough negotiator, but also recognize when the time has come to make concessions and show skill and creativity to work out compromises. There seems to be general agreement that all Working Groups and Coreper are subject to this culture of compromise and mutual responsiveness. In fact, observers have called this ‘a kind of consensus reflex.’ 
	Generally, there is a powerful preference for accommodating the difficulties of member states rather than voting dissidents down. Because all the negotiators at the table find themselves in the same field of tension, they can generally relate to the predicament of individual delegates faced with the difficulty of reconciling different positions. Just as the generally cooperative climate creates incentives for a consensus, there are also subtle disincentives to guard against the opposite. Uncooperative behavior is seen as raising questions about the credibility of the negotiating partner and his/her reliability as an ally; Or as an official put it “as anybody who witnesses the battle of words among Coreper members will have the impression that they belong to a separate club with its own norms and rituals.” 
	To the extend that socialization to a community-method is the process by which actors learn new rules, develop new identifications and new patterns of mutual trust, Coreper offers a group setting with strong identifications of membership in a collective decision-making system. As such, Coreper can clearly be considered an important mechanism for socialization. This can be witnessed most powerfully by the way in which the experiences of belonging to this body shapes the motives of the representatives. Differently stated, when is a Coreper member successful? One could draw the premature conclusion that one is successful when achieving a maximum of negotiating successes for one’s country. However, according to our interviews, this is only half true, for time and experience teach the representatives that willingness to compromise and work on joint solutions is equally important for acting successfully in Coreper and for gaining the respect of his/her colleagues. In short, a socialization effect in the spirit of the community becomes apparent here, particularly as members stay on in the institution.

Tension between Coreper and other High Level Groups in the Council. 
	Coreper is not the only player when it comes to preparing Council meetings. There are a number of committees within the Council for which explicit provision was made in the EU treaty: 
$		The Article 36-Committee co-ordinating  Justice and Home Affairs
$		The Economic and Financial Committee
$		The Article 133-Committee for the negotiation of international trade agreements
$		The Special Committee on Agriculture (since 1960)
$		The Employment Committee. 

	Most High Level Groups are based on the EU treaty; however, Coreper may set up others at the request of the ministers. The Committees consist of the personal representatives of the national ministers, and, notwithstanding Coreper's function, they deliver opinions to the Council and prepare the content of the respective Council meeting. Opinions addressed to the Council are dealt within Coreper, which may add comments or recommendations, announce its dissenting opinion or even refer a dossier back to the group to be dealt with again. Even if the High Level Groups ease Coreper's work, there is a system-immanent tension between them. One of Coreper representatives went as far as saying that the High Level Groups “undermine Coreper’s work.” 
	When one ponders the question of why the Council set up these groups, the conclusion is startling. Our research suggests that this reflects an attempt to strengthen the national components in the EU through additional groups of personal representatives of the ministers, given the fact that the European Parliament has gradually gained power. However, one cannot escape the impression that this is also related to a shift in the role of Coreper which is perceived as subtly becoming more an instrument of the collectivity than of national interest. The best evidence for this assertion is to consider the areas in which such High Level Groups have been set up. They largely concern two areas: firstly agriculture, economics, and finances – these are among the oldest EU policy areas and also consume the most financial resources. Secondly, committees of the second and third pillars. Both pillars are influenced more strongly by intergovernmental cooperation so that we cannot yet talk about genuine common policies. The intention seems to be to uphold national sovereignty in these particularly sensitive areas.
	We may conclude therefore that such new committees strengthen the national components in all those areas where member states are determined to avert a feared loss of national power. To the extent that governments do not wish to reach agreement in these policy areas in Coreper, at least not without assuring themselves of a prior detailed discussion of national viewpoints and interests, national policymakers avail themselves of such new institutions whose loyalty to the national agenda seem, in their eyes, less “compromised.”
	Summing up, the above analysis points to numerous mechanisms in which national  power and influence, strategic rationality, and intensity of preferences as well as rule-making decisions in Coreper are significantly affected by sociological and institutionalist aspects. By departing from instructions, making recommendations to home governments, acting on the need to minimize confrontation and to maintain alliances with certain other members, as well as by signaling agreement although the national capital cannot make up its mind, Coreper regularly transcends its more limited official role.

The Role of Coreper in Co-decision Procedure with the European Parliament
	The co-decision procedure, that is the joint decision-making by the European Parliament and the Council, has become more important in recent years due to the fact that the former had to be given more rights in the making of legislation. Both the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Nice Treaty significantly increased the number of policy areas that are subject to co-decision, around which complex procedures of unwritten rules and behavioral norms have developed.


	Co-decision means that Council and Parliament have to reach agreement, which, if it is not forthcoming, requires a conciliation procedure. This is initiated jointly by the Council President and the President of Parliament and must be completed within six weeks. The Council is represented on the Conciliation Committee by the minister of the country holding the presidency and 24 Permanent Representatives, who have voting rights. This fact is significant because unlike Coreper itself, in which the role of the representative is more that of an instructed national delegate, an official in the Conciliation Committee is in a more complex situation. In addition to still upholding national interests, there is now also the task of representing the Council as a whole vis-à-vis Parliament; i.e., delicate arrangements need to be maintained and internal deals must be defended. For instance, a counter proposal by the legislature may unravel a carefully balanced set of tradeoffs in the Council that could void any compromise that had already been reached. However, an unpopular or isolated national position, should it resurface, can become even more unsustainable, when faced with opposition by the other Council members and the Parliament. In short, the pressure to conform and compromise becomes even greater. Sometimes decisions have to be made on the spot in the conciliation process, without the chance of conferring with the capitals. It is in this capacity that the ambassadors approximate the role of a true decision-maker and act most autonomously of their home governments.
	
Changing dynamics due to structural changes.
	As the conciliation procedure is prepared and conducted by Coreper, the increase in the number of policy areas subject to co-decision has led to greater time pressure and a greater need for efficiency. The Council and Parliament now try to reach agreement at an earlier point in time in order to avoid the complex and lengthy conciliation procedure. Interviewed officials pointed to the example of the Sixth Framework Programme for Research and Technology Development where agreement between the Council and Parliament was reached without conciliation. This stood in marked contrast to the preceding Fifth Framework Programme, where the positions of the two legislative bodies had remained too far apart. This was at a time however, when the Framework Programme still had to be unanimously approved in the Council despite the fact that it was already subject to co-decision making. The experience of all sides with the torturous process that followed suggests a collective learning of sorts as all sides tried to avoid a repeat the next time. 
	Summing up, the co-decision procedure has raised the role of Coreper in the legislative process by affording its members a special role in the Conciliation Committee. While the above evidence clearly suggests that this new structural arrangement has affected the strategic calculus of member states, it is as of yet unclear whether one can indeed conclude that Coreper has a “distinct” mediating role in the form of playing an increasingly autonomous role. There is some suggestion according to our interviews, however, that national officials fear that collectively Coreper tends to stray rather far from the national interest.

Coreper’s New Role  in the context of the European Council
	The European Council can be regarded as the real political decision-making center that, before action is taken in law, sets forward-looking parameters for the future development of the EU. Its crucial importance in terms of integration carries over to those bodies and procedures involved in the Council’s organization and agenda-setting. 

Preparing the Agenda and Drafting Conclusions.
	The Treaty of Amsterdam increased the importance of the European Council to the extent that it can now pass resolutions on joint strategies in EU foreign and security policy, making it an independent body of the second pillar. In practical terms, the European Council has a legal mandate to stimulate the development of the EU and provide appropriate guidelines to this end, adopt conclusions for the principles of economic and labor policies, agree upon joint foreign policy strategies, and push forward the developments in security policy. Coreper II’s involvement at this level of decision making came rather late following the Conclusions of the Presidency at the Seville Council in June 2002. Previously, there had simply been a single letter of invitation from the president to his/her colleagues. Now, an agenda is drawn up by Coreper and confirmed by the General Council the day before the meeting of the heads of state and government. Also, the conclusions of the European Council – on principles of economic and labor policies, joint foreign policy strategies, etc.–  are now also prepared by Coreper, while in the past, they had been drawn up during the conference. Already the Brussels European Council of 2004 gave some indication that the Seville reforms were proving their effectiveness.​[8]​ For instance, nearly the entire set of conclusions agreed upon had been, what Ludlow (2004 3.2:1) called, “pre-cooked” by Coreper and further molded by the External Relations and General Affairs Council.
	Recent accounts of Coreper’s contribution to Council preparation by making the meetings more coherent and focused thus clearly suggest a role exceeding that of being merely a coordinating secretariat. According to Ludlow (2004 3.6:4), the Irish Presidency of 2004 succeeded in “establishing a firm Coreper II grip on the process [of Council organization] which meant that the draft Conclusions that were submitted to the heads of state and government were better than any previous ones.” Observers attributed this to the Irish Coreper Anne Anderson and generally expressed confidence with respect to the Luxemburg Presidency in that an experienced diplomat such as Martine Schommer would follow the Irish lead. Another example is the Spring European Council of 2004, which devoted remarkably little time to the principle agenda, the Lisbon Strategy 2004, so that the emerging text was almost entirely the work of Coreper.
	Coreper’s new role in association with the European Council has also had an impact on the formal relationship between the representatives and their home governments. Predictably, there has formed a more direct linkage between the representatives in Brussels and the center of the home government, thus bypassing the usual communication chain through the foreign ministry. This provides the ambassadors and their deputies potentially with greater and more varied access to the home government, thus enhancing their role as “decision brokers.” The intimate knowledge of the Council agenda and the details of negotiation also place the representative in an advantageous position vis-à-vis most other officials, both foreign and domestic.
	All this permits the conclusion that Coreper has gained a new crucial task, increasing its own importance in the process. The representatives now participate in decision-making about political issues that are of fundamental importance for the development of the EU. 

Other Aspects of Corepers Involvement with the European Council.
	There are also other Council matters in which Coreper may expand its influence. At their meeting in June 2004, the heads of state and government agreed that preparatory work on the European External Action Service should begin immediately after the signature of the constitutional treaty. Although primary responsibility during the planning phase is to lie with Javier Solana and the Commission, Coreper is charged with holding discussions on the matter in order to involve actively the Presidency. 
	Corper was also to have a role in preparing the Intergovernmental Conferences concerning the new European draft Constitution. However, this arena of potential Coreper involvement fell victim to the desire by the Italian Presidency to finish by December 2003 and limit discussion to the highest political level, involving solely foreign ministers and heads of state. Although, the proceedings lasted longer than originally anticipated and did involve also senior civil servants from the home governments as well as members of the General Affairs and External Relations Council, the IGC largely bypassed Coreper. Small member states fearing that the results of the Convention reflected the interests of the large nations were not very happy with the procedure proposed by Italy. They would have instead preferred that negotiations be carried out at Coreper level in order to resolve those points where a loss of power for the smaller member seemed greatest.

 Outlook -- Expected Changes in a Larger Europe
	Given EU enlargement, meaning that representatives of 25 instead of 15 states now sit around the table, there will be less leeway for negotiation in future. Already the Sevilla Conclusions aimed at making Council meetings more effective and coherent did so with an eye to impending enlargement which was to render the once  intimate character of such summits invariably a thing of the past. As enlargement affects Coreper, it will also have to face a change in the existing political dynamics. There is simply not enough time for formal or informal negotiations in the current sense; procedures will become even more complicated; table surveys almost impossible. This creates an impression that the Permanent Representatives become more “discouraged” and follow their instructions more closely. Negotiating needs time and to the extent that there is less available to one ambassador among 25, the dynamics are bound to change. 
	The accession of Central East and Southern European countries has also increased the heterogeneity of positions. If existing procedures are retained, the amount of meeting time required will triple or more negotiations will have to be transferred from Coreper to Working Groups, or it will simply take longer to reach a decision. 
	For the above reasons, Coreper II has been discussing procedural reforms and has imposed a number of restrictions upon itself, which however, according to our interviews, nobody obeys. No new written rules of procedure have been issued as of yet. However, there is some preliminary indication that informal adaptations are taking place to off-set the new constraints. Several observers reported that the new member states have learned quickly and that, generally, instructions have become clearer and positions are more streamlined, thus reducing the need for further clarification. Also, the larger setting has contributed to informal alliance building among sub-groups that already approach the negotiations with coordinated positions.
	Enlargement, therefore, presents double-edged sword of sorts for Coreper. On one hand, the complexities created by the new reality makes it more likely that, as far as the Council is concerned, decisions and conclusions are “pre-cooked”, to use Ludlows (2004 3.2:1) expression, in Coreper. This may actually enhance its role. On the other hand, Coreper may be forced to devolve some of its own functions, either formally to the level of Working Groups or informally to semi-fixed regional and functional alliances within the Council. In future decision-making, group formations and group spokesmen could play an important role. It is as of yet unclear, whether this transfer of decision-making to an assortment of informal arenas would weaken the institution or simply reflect an internal adaptation with no real consequences for the body’s standing in the institutional structure.

Conclusion
	Coreper has played an important role in the Council's decision-making machinery since the early years of the EU. In its traditional role as a preparatory body for Council meetings, it combines political awareness and overview with the ability to deal with highly technical subject matters. We may conclude therefore, that the representatives in Coreper or the Working Group can exercise pressure and influence over the instructing ministry, in terms of shaping positions, giving up positions in order to reach a compromise, drawing up workable compromise solutions or deciding when is the best time to present positions. In our opinion, the limits of this influence are found where it is a matter of fixed or sensitive national interests. And of course, the personality of the individuals concerned also plays an important role (personal commitment, integration and weight in the home government, etc.). Furthermore, Coreper has also functioned as an important agent of member state socialization as there is ample evidence of learning and behavioral adaptation, lending support to the socialization thesis. The fact that national policy makers have expressed skepticism about being adequately “listened to” in Coreper and their tendency to entrust other high-level groups with sensitive policy matters further attests to the degree of autonomous decision making capability of the permanent representatives.
	Following the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty, Coreper has taken on an additional role in co-decision work. Since 2002 Coreper has also been preparing the upgraded European Council, consequently increasing its own influence. On the other hand, those policy areas that are not prepared by Coreper but by separate High Level Groups have also become more important over the last ten years. Of greater significance for Coreper´s future role may be the way in which the Council adapts its working methods to cope with enlargement. Fewer Council formations, longer presidencies, changed relationships between the European Council and the Council of Ministers would significantly affect the context within which Coreper operates. Thus, many aspects of the political role of Coreper are currently in flux, leading to questions that can only be answered in due time when the new arrangements have solidified. The adoption and implementation of the new constitution is obviously of enormous significance for Coreper´s future. Our research permits the preliminary conclusion, nonetheless, that EU decision making is not determined mainly by relative power and instrumental interest calculations, but that communicative rationality matters substantially. Coreper is a key instrument in the production and maintenance of a community-method, characterized by a shared mutual purpose to understand each others´problems, and a culture of compromise which results in a particular style of bargaining and context of interaction. Neither the image of the stealthy power brokers nor that of the loyal servants to their government masters is accurate. The permanent representatives and their deputies are rather important decision brokers with a considerable scope for independent action.
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^1	 	 The Council of Ministers meets in nine formations since June 2002: General Affairs and External Relations, Justice and Home Affairs, Agriculture and Fisheries etc. 
^2	 	 The different Framework Programmes for Research and Technology Development serve in this research as a reference points for analysing a major policy area and the Working Groups.
^3	 	 Seated around the large conference table there are the permanent representatives,  the representatives of the two groups preparing Coreper sessions (Mertens and Antici Groups) and the representative of the relevant Working Group. Since spring 2003 representatives of the new member states have participated in the meetings but, until their formal accession, without voting rights. The Commission also attends Coreper meetings, as do the Council secretariat and the legal service.
^4	 	 In Austria, this phenomenon is accentuated by the long previous dominance of one political party (Social Democrats 1970-99) and the existence of a two-party coalition government. 
^5	 	 A representative is usually present at the meetings.
^6	 	 Cf. the Spanish example cited earlier. It linked budgetary approval on the RTD framework programme to the compatibility of this budget with the overall EU six year budget (Agenda 2000).
^7	 	 “I have always regretted and regard it as a serious omission that Austria has neglected to find reliable allies since it joined the EU in 1995.” (an Austrian Coreper official) 
^8	 	 For a more detailed discussion see for instance Ludlow Oct. 2002: 2.
